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ABSTRACT
We use a novel database on U. S. federal court decisions to measure the changes in the state
of copyright protection in both statute and case law. We combine an index of copyright breadth
derived from this database with a quarterly panel of ¯rms in creative industries over the years
1986-1998. Using this data, we measure the impact of changes in the breadth of copyright
on the market valuation of ¯rm equity. We maintain the assumption that equity markets will
incorporate the value of copyright innovations into the price of equity. After controlling for
a variety of fundamental determinants of ¯rm-level excess returns to equity, we ¯nd that a
court case broadening copyright is associated with a statistically signi¯cant 23-45 basis points
increase in a ¯rm's excess return. Our results obtain across both 4-5 year sub-samples and the
size distribution of ¯rms.
Keywords: Copyright, Asset Pricing, Intellectual Property, Law.
JEL Classi¯cation: C23, G12, K0, L82, O34, Z1.
PRELIMINARY DRAFT
¤Address: Department of Economics, U. S. Naval Academy, 589 McNair Road, Annapolis, MD, 21402. This
research was funded by a Naval Academy Research Council Grant.1 Introduction
Creative and intellectual expression has long been a®orded unique legal consideration in the United
States. The centrality of copyright in U. S. federal law is easily established by its explicit inclusion
in the original United States constitution. Copyright is even more deep-rooted in Europe; 1469
witnessed perhaps the earliest extension of intellectual property protection when the Republic of
Venice began issuing exclusive rights to the publication of books.1
While it is certainly important to protect intellectual property, the degree of protection is a
subject of some debate. In the U. S., a series of congressional acts have continually increased the
length of copyright. The original Copyright Act of 1790, modelled on the English Statute of Anne,
granted authors copyright protection for 14 years with a renewal period of 14 years.2 In 1831, the
initial term was extended to 28 years, and in 1909 the renewal period was also extended to 28
years. In 1976, the initial term was extended to 50 years (75 for joint works), in 1992 copyright
renewal became automatic, and most recently in 1998, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act established protection for the life of the author plus an additional 75 years. Congress has
also passed acts which extend copyright protection to more modern forms of expression. In 1990,
copyright law ¯rst prohibited commercial lending of software, while the Database Investment and
Intellectual Property Anti-Piracy Act of 1996 o®ered increased protection to computer databases.
In the past 20 years, the Berne Convention and the Uruguay Round Agreements have also served
to coordinate U. S. copyright protection with international principals.3; 4
Recent changes in copyright law have caused some to wonder if protection has not become
1Khan (2001) provides a detailed description of the entire international history of copyright. Plant (1934) and
Khan and Sokolo® (2001) provide a thorough discussion of the origins of British and American copyright, respectively.
2The statute was entitled \An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Securing the Copies of Maps, Charts,
and Books to the Authors and Proprietors of Such Copies."
3The agreement was in fact part of GATT, which included a proviso called \Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property" (TRIPs).
4This information is summarized by the \Copyright Timeline" available at http://www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/
timeline.html.
1overly broad. A New York Times editorial, in response to the Supreme Court's decision upholding
Congress' extension of copyright protection, claimed that \the court's decision may make con-
stitutional sense, but it does not serve the public well."5 This sentiment was widely echoed and
prominent legal scholars have openly wondered whether or not the congressional and judicial ex-
tension of copyright has gone too far.6
The problem with repeated broadening of copyright protection is that it creates monopoly
power. Ideally, the optimal breadth of copyright should balance incentives for creative expression
with the welfare losses associated with monopoly. 7
Rather than actually measuring the value of changes in copyright protection, most empirical
work on copyright protection has focused on the relationship between infringement and protection.
For example, Harbaugh and Khemka (2000) ask whether or not copyright protection increases
piracy while Kranenberg and Hogenbrink (2003) study some of the international determinants of
piracy. Chiang and Assane (2002) study software piracy among college students. Other work has
attempted to more directly the incentive e®ects of changes in copyright protection. Towse (1999),
Khan (2001), and Hui and Png (2002) assess, respectively, the impact of variations in copyright
statutes on musician royalties, book publishers' returns, and movie industry output. Generally
speaking, these studies have found that changes in copyright protection have had little impact on
industry output; this is not surprising, however, given 1) incentive e®ects can only be fully displayed
after a considerable time, and 2) the ambiguous predictions of theoretical models such as Landes
and Posner (1989) concerning the response of copyright output and increased protection.
5See Anonymous (2003)
6See, for example, Epstein (1998) and Lessig and Samuelson (1998).
7The social costs and bene¯ts of copyright protection are discussed in Landes and Posner (1989); see also Miceli
and Adelstein (2003). Johnson (1985) considers the dynamic aspect of consumer welfare in the presence of copyright.
However, Novos and Waldman (1984) claim that, from a theoretical perspective, any second-best welfare costs
associated with copyright are not signi¯cant. In addition, Klein, Lerner and Murphy (2002) note that since copyright
only extends exclusivity to the expression of an idea, and not to an idea itself, authors are granted something short
of complete monopoly (for more on the distinction between protection of innovations and expressions, see Besen and
Raskind (1991)).
2Rather than trying to measure the impact of incentive e®ects in changing copyright law, or infer
them indirectly from data on infringement rates, we attempt instead to measure the discounted
present value of expanded copyright protection. We also develop a measure of copyright breadth
which allows for higher-frequency change in the nature of copyright protection: we consider existing
state of copyright as de¯ned by both statute and case law. Over almost any period of time,
court decisions will alter the practical boundaries of copyright protection far more frequently than
statutory changes, thereby providing a richer background against which one can test for a range of
possible e®ects of copyright on incentives. In order to conduct this exercise, we quantify the overall
breadth of copyright via a novel case law index formed by cataloguing those U. S. federal court
decisions which broaden and narrow copyright over the years 1986-98.
In order to avoid the second pitfall of empirical analysis (unknown lags in the economic impact
of legal innovations), we rely upon the forward-looking nature of equity markets. Our maintained
assumption is that, for publicly-traded ¯rms that primarily rely upon creative intellectual property,
the net present discounted value of a change in the nature of copyright protection will be incorpo-
rated into the current price of equity. This re-pricing of equity should follow close on the heels of
legal innovations, regardless of delays in their transmission to the return on copyrightable works.
To control for the non-legal determinants of equity valuation, we estimate a standard quarterly
fundamentals-based model of returns to equity in excess of the risk-free rate. After applying this
approach to a panel of ¯rms, we ¯nd that one federal court case broadening copyright protection,
all else equal, is associated with a statistically signi¯cant increase in the excess return to equity of
22-45 basis points, or approximately $4 million - $8.4 million for a given ¯rm.8 In keeping with
prior research, we fail to obtain a statistically signi¯cant response of excess returns to variations in
copyright statutes. Given that courts are the ultimate arbiters of intellectual property protections
8The monetary value of this estimate is measured in 1998 dollars. The value is obtained by taking the product of
the relevant coe±cients and the average market value of equity for the ¯rms in our sample in 1998:Q4 ($1.86 billion).
3in practice, and that future decisions are based on precedent, this result seems reasonable. Our
results are stable across sub-samples, robust to the inclusion of a broad cross-section of ¯rms, and
coherent across the size spectrum of ¯rms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the details of our procedure
for organizing case law and statutory law into indices measuring changes in breadth of copyright.
Section 3 discusses our estimation framework and empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Measuring Copyright Protection
The breadth of copyright law evolves over time in two complementary ways: through statutory
changes, and through court decisions. As in many areas of law, in copyright law, statutes describe
the nature of the law in general terms, while court decisions describe how statutory decisions are
implemented and enforced. Thus, our empirical methodology captures not only the impact of
changes in the law's intent, but also the impact of changes in the degree and extent to which the
law is enforced.
Our approach, in which we relate \news" about changes in the breadth of copyright decisions
to the market valuation of ¯rms, is forward looking. As a copyright is essentially an asset which
generates a °ow of future returns, all previous information concerning the breadth of copyright
protection should already be re°ected in the current valuation of ¯rms. To the extent that case
law is driven by precedent, one would expect that cases which broaden copyright protection by
ruling in favor of the possessor of intellectual property (we give some examples below) expand
the level of copyright protection that ¯rms may expect in the future. Of course, there are both
practical and theoretical di±culties in measuring changes in case law. Before discussing some of
the di±culties and nuances of constructing indices of breadth of copyright, it is helpful to discuss
our basic method. Our approach is as follows:
41. Catalogue changes in copyright law. - We begin by developing a list of \important"
court decisions or new statutes relating to copyright protection. We focus on decisions made
between 1986 and 1998; a time limitation imposed by ¯rm level data availability from the
¯rm level data source. We catalogue all decisions pertaining to copyright law over the time
period made in the twelve United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court.
2. Date the change. We next matched court decisions with a decision or ¯ling date, and
grouped the case law into quarters. We followed a similar procedure in cataloguing statutory
changes, using the date at which the President signed the bill into law.
3. Assess the impact of the decision on breadth of copyright. After reading each case
in our list of important decisions, we recorded whether or not the outcome of the case could
be said to broaden or narrow the breadth of copyright protection that ¯rms may expect in
the future.
4. Construct a quarterly index capturing the nature of news on copyright protec-
tion. For each quarter from 1986-1998, we used the data resulting from the ¯rst three steps to
count the number of cases which \broadened" and \narrowed" copyright protection. The dif-
ference between these two numbers gives us an index of common law broadening of copyright
protection net of cases which narrowed copyright.
Of course, our resulting index is far from perfect. Our baseline index makes no judgement as
to the relative importance of di®erent cases, but instead assumes that every high court decision
is created equally. When a court decision is released, a general consensus may emerge that the
case is somehow marginal. It is di±cult to perfectly measure this type of historical assessment.
However, in order to achieve some di®erential weighting on cases, we also use ex post information
5to identify more important decisions. Our comprehensive list of cases is derived from publications
which summarize copyright law developments in \real time." As is further described below, we use
a more recent synopsis of federal copyright law to eliminate cases which are retrospectively less
important, thereby obtaining a second index of ex post in°uential cases. This should allow us to
approximately capture sentiment regarding the importance of individual court decisions.
Our index also does not include what might have been important decisions pertaining to copy-
right emanating from lower courts. We chose to focus decisions issued by federal appellate and
higher courts for two reasons, one practical and one theoretical. As it stands, the time frame for
our analysis required reading some 600 cases; if we had also included decisions from lower courts,
this number would have expanded (by a conservative estimate) approximately tenfold. However, in
our favor, by focusing on decisions from higher courts, it is likely that we have captured those deci-
sions which are truly important at the margin, because cases which have been appealed a number
of times are likely to address di±cult and newer issues of legal interpretation.
We were also confronted with a number of practical di±culties in construction of the index. A
non-negligible portion of cases simply could not be classi¯ed as broadening or narrowing copyright
protection. Figuring most prominently in this subset, were three types of cases: work-for-hire cases,
joint authorship cases, and jurisdictional cases. Work-for-hire cases result from disputes between
workers and employers over who is truly the author of a work: the worker or the employer. In these
cases, the breadth of copyright itself is not in question, but the ownership of it is. While one might
draw some intuition about how, for example, future valuation of a software development ¯rm might
change if the court decided that copyright in software rested with the employee, this we judged was
more of a distributional issue than an issue of copyright breadth.9 Similarly, joint authorship cases
9In any case, the question as to how ¯rm market valuation should be a®ected by changes in work for hire precedents
becomes much more di±cult to answer when two ¯rms such as a software development company and a publishing
company dispute ownership in copyright of software.
6also do not pertain directly to breadth of copyright, but to the distribution of ownership rights.
Jurisdictional cases do not involve issues of copyright breadth, but only whether or not the court
in question (or some lower court) has the authority to rule in the case.
To give the reader a better feel for the exact nature of our indices, we now turn to discussion of
some of the details of our indices. We ¯rst discuss the nature of the resulting index for statutory
decisions, and then discuss the nature of our index resulting from an assessment of the path of
common law copyright. We then discuss some of the reservations one might have with this approach.
2.1 Statutory Copyright Changes
Statutory changes in the U. S. generally occur relatively infrequently, and have without exception
broadened the extent of copyright protection. Over the period 1985-1998, one can identify 6
important statutory decisions, listed below with the dates and a brief description of the legislation:
² October 31, 1985 - Berne Convention Implementation Act
² December 1, 1990 - Computer Software Rental Amendments Act
² June 26, 1992 - Copyright Amendment act of 1992
² Dec 8, 1994 - Uruguay Round Agreements Act
² October 27, 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act/Fairness in Musical Licensing
Act of 1998
² October 28, 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The Berne convention and the Uruguay Round Agreements expanded international enforcement
of copyright law, the Sonny Bono act extended the term of copyrights substantially, the computer
software rental amendment placed restrictions on the possibility of renting computer software,
7thus broadening the copyright protection of software, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
pronounced the deliberate circumvention of encryption designed to prevent unauthorized access
an infringement. In the quarters corresponding to these changes, our index of statutory changes
received a value of one, and was zero otherwise. There are, of course, some important (implicit)
assumptions about the nature of statutory changes in the law, some of which we alluded to above
in reference to case law. For one, this methodology e®ectively treats all innovations in statutory
rules as identical. Second, it assumes that information about the timing of statutory decisions was
not known substantially before the legislation was enacted.
2.2 Court Decisions and the Breadth of Copyright
Our case law index draws from the cases reported in Copyright Law Decisions.10 This publication
is a comprehensive summary of all copyright decisions made over roughly two year periods. For each
of the two-year periods between 1984 to 1998, we obtained the corresponding volume, catalogued
the dates of the cases and the nature of decisions, and tabulated the results.11 From each of these
measures, the result was X important decisions. Y of these broadened copyright, while Z narrowed
copyright.12 It is worth emphasizing that our methodology captures those innovations in copyright
case law which were viewed as signi¯cant at the time our source was published. This implies
that our measure of copyright case law innovation indicates important common law developments
as determined in \real time" (contemporaneously rather than retrospectively). The comprehensive
list of cases which is obtained from this source is further re¯ned using recent scholarship. Brown and
Denicola (2002) present a contemporary synopsis of prominent federal court decisions pertaining to
copyright. If a cases is contained in both this source as well as our ¯rst source, we include that case
10The ¯rst volume of this publication is Commercepace.5emClearing House (1981). We employed the two-year
volumes 1983-4 through 1997-8.
11We use Lexis-Nexis to identify the initial ¯ling date for each of the cases.
12Each copyright case, accompanied with the court, and a brief description of the case, can be accessed at the
following address: http://www.usna.edu/Users/econ/bcunning/baker_cunningham_copyright_cases.xls
8in a second index. This index captures ex-post in°uential federal copyright cases. To the extent
that interested parties were able to anticipate the retrospective importance of cases, this second
index should provide a more accurate measurement of perceived changes in copyright case law.
To better illustrate our method, the following are some samples of the cases which entered into
our indices. The sample serves also to illustrate the diversity of the cases considered by court.
Perhaps some of the di±culties in judging whether or not a case in fact expanded the breadth
of copyright protection will also become apparent to the reader. We categorized the following as
decisions that narrowed the breadth of copyright protection:
² Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co. (499 U. S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282
(1991)) - The Supreme Court ruled that the partial copying of entries in a telephone directory
did not constitute infringement of copyright.
² Wallace International Silversmiths v. Godinger Silver Art Co. (Certiorari Denied
499 U. S. 976, 111 S.Ct. 1622 (1991)) - The Supreme Court rules that baroque silverware
produced by the defendant did not infringe the plainti®'s copyright in similar silverware
because the design similarities were primarily the result of functional similarities in baroque
silverware.
² Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International (49 F.3d 807 (1995)) - The court
found that the menu hierarchy of the Lotus 1-2-3 system is a functional aspect of design, and
therefore not copyrightable.
² Campbell v. Acu®-Rose Music (510 U. S. 569, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (1994)) - The Supreme
Court reversed a lower court in ruling that a version of the popular Roy Orbison Hit \Pretty
Woman" produced by the rap act \2 Live Crew" is fair use.
² Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp. (137 F.3d 109 (1988)) - The court ¯nds that a
9parody of a popular photograph of then-pregnant actress Demi Moore featuring Leslie Nielsen
used in advertising a movie was covered by fair use and did not constitute infringement.
Decisions that broadened copyright protection include:
² Mason v. Montgomery Data (967 F.2d 135 (1992)) - The court found that maps created
and supplemented to include additional information compiled by the plainti® were su±ciently
original to warrant copyright protection.
² Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group (150 F.3d 132 (1998)) - The
court found that a quiz book on material deriving from the popular TV show \Seinfeld"
constituted an infringement in spite of the defendant's protests that the book related only
objective facts about the show.
² Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Service (99 F.3d 1381 (1996))
- The court found that production of \course packets," which consist of collections of copy-
righted articles arranged in booklet form for student use by a local copy service constitutes
copyright infringement.
² West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central (799 F.2d 1219 (1986)) - The court prohib-
ited Mead, producers of Lexis software for legal research, from adding West's \star pagination"
to output, as the star pagination was novel enough to warrant copyright protection.
² Los Angeles News Service v. Tullo (973 F.2d 791 (1992)) - The court found that a
service which marketed video clippings from television news broadcasts infringed broadcasters'
copyrights.
Some speci¯cs of the nature of the copyright case index are presented in Table 1. The ¯rst
column of the table reports aggregate information about the index. Of higher-court cases over
10the 15 year period, 542 allowed de¯nitive judgement as to whether they broadened or narrowed
copyright; of these decisions, 13 were made by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court made 6
decisions which could be said to broaden copyright protection, and 7 which narrowed copyright
protection. Generally speaking, this balance extends to the case law as a whole; high courts have
not had a substantial tendency to either broaden or narrow copyright protection. Figure 1 shows
the progress of the index over time by tracing the cumulative sum of the net decisions broadening
copyright each quarter.13 The cumulative count shows that there may be at best some small
upward trend towards broadening copyright decisions in the case law, but by and large there was
no de¯nitive trend in the case law.
We have also categorized each case according to its relevance to a particular industry or indus-
tries. The last three columns of Table 1 break down the cases by 2-digit industry SIC code, and
may help further clarify the nature of our index. SIC code 27 is the designation for publishers,
including newspapers, books, magazines, and periodicals. We also included in this count cases
pertaining to activities which could be construed as \miscellaneous" publishing, such as map pro-
duction and duplication and greeting card manufacturing. SIC code 73 is reserved for ¯rms which
engage in software production or programming industries, and SIC code 78 refers to motion picture
production and distribution. In each case, our data do not reveal any pronounced tendency for
court decisions to broaden or narrow the breadth of copyright protection. We also experimented
with further breaking down the data into 4-digit SIC codes, or including additional SIC codes, but
found that the value-added of doing this was low, either because the results were too thin to be
useful or enlightening, or because complementary ¯nancial data was not available.14
We now turn to specifying an empirical framework for assessing the impact of news about
13To aid in understanding the ¯gure, for example, if 5 broadening decisions were made in a quarter and 2 narrowing
decisions were made in a quarter, the cumulative count would increase by 3.
14After our ¯rst three industries, the most frequently represented industries were radio and television broadcasting,
toy manufacturing, and garment manufacturing.
11copyright protection on the market valuation of ¯rms.
3 Empirical Speci¯cation and Results
In order to implement our approach for estimating the value of copyright protection, as priced by
equity markets, we require a reduced-form speci¯cation. Vuolteenaho (2000, 2002) establishes a
framework for estimating a dynamic system (VAR) containing excess returns, cash-°ow news, and
expected return news at the ¯rm level. We focus on the excess returns equation in this speci¯cation
and adapt it in order to: 1) ascertain the determinants of equity valuation at a higher (quarterly)
frequency and 2) include measures of innovations in federal statutes and case law pertaining to
copyright. The fundamental ¯nancial variables in the speci¯cation are:
Rjit ¡ monthly % increase in price of common stock, quarterly average
Fjit ¡ yield to maturity on three month Treasury bill, quarterly average
Bjit ¡ book value of ¯rm within quarter
Mjit ¡ market value of ¯rm within quarter
Xjit ¡ earnings of ¯rm, within quarter
where j = 1;:::;J is an index of ¯rms, i = 1;:::;I is an index of industries, and t = 1;:::;T is
a quarterly index of time. From these fundamentals, we calculate the primary ¯nancial variables
employed in the estimation framework. The log return on stock in excess of the risk-free rate is
de¯ned according to rjit ´ ln(1 + Rjit + Fjit) ¡ ln(1 + Fjit). The log return on equity is calculated
according to et ´ ln(1 + Xjit=Bjit¡1) while the log book-to-market ratio is obtained from µjit =
ln(Bjit=Mjit), as in Vuolteenaho.
We employ two ¯nal variables in order to measure alterations in the legal environment. The
12¯rst is a simple dummy variable, ¾t, taking on a value of one if there has been a change in federal
statutes pertaining to copyright within the quarter. The second, °t, is a count of the number of cases
broadening copyright in all branches of the federal judiciary, minus those cases narrowing copyright.
Our speci¯cation explains the log excess return on equity as a function of these innovations in
copyright law as well as lagged values of ¯rm ¯nancial variables and an autoregressive process:




















where di is an industry dummy variable, ¿ is a year trend and qs is a quarterly dummy variable.
We allow for ¯rm-level heteroscedasticity in the error term.15 It is important to note that we
assume there is no role for ¯rm-level ¯xed e®ects in our speci¯cation. This is consistent with prior
techniques for predicting ¯rm-level excess equity returns and implies that the presence of lagged
dependent variables will not hamper the reliability of our results.16; 17 In addition, this speci¯cation
implicitly assumes that there are signi¯cant spillovers in copyright case law decisions so that the
aggregate number of decisions in a quarter (lagged) has an impact on individual ¯rms, regardless
of whether the ¯rm was directly involved in the case.18 The book-to-market ratio is included in
(1) to control for short-run undervaluation of equity which leads to subsequent increases in excess
returns. Likewise, the return-on-equity captures the impact on excess returns of innovations in a
¯rm's cash °ow. In the late 1990s, aggregate and ¯rm-level excess returns exhibited a signi¯cant
increase. A time trend is included in order to control for this trend behavior in excess returns.
15Likelihood ratio tests regularly rejected the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity at a 1% level of signi¯cance.
16For a detailed analysis of the di±culties associated with ¯xed e®ects in the presence of lagged dependent variables,
see Baltagi (1995), p. 125.
17There are solid theoretical reasons for believing that ¯xed e®ects are inappropriate in our estimation framework.
Over long periods of time, the excess equity returns of one ¯rm should not consistently and predictably be above or
below the returns of other ¯rms (equity traders should eliminate such persistent returns at the ¯rm level). We also
have an empirical rationale for excluding ¯xed e®ects: when our speci¯cation is estimated with ¯rm ¯xed e®ects we
fail to ¯nd a statistically signi¯cant improvement in the ¯t of the speci¯cation.
18We explore the robustness of this assumption.
13Because of possibly delays in the transmission and processing of information in equity markets,
we include a number of lags of the independent variables (the autoregressive terms are included to
control for possible serial correlation). All results are obtained through feasible generalized least
squares estimation.
Our ¯rm-level equity market and ¯nancial data comes from the quarterly ¯les in the combined
COMPUSTAT / CRSP database. We obtained this information for industries which are primarily
focused on the production of copyrighted material.19 All common stock prices were adjusted for
splits. In addition, missing book values were calculated from ¯nancial °ow statistics and adjusted
for tax considerations where possible.20 Our information on copyright law was obtained through
the process described above. We restricted our sample to the 1985-98 time period in order to
obtain a reasonable cross-section of 29 ¯rms in our sample.21 Descriptive statistics, calculated
from both the entire sample and the industry subsets, are presented in Table 2. Excess stock
returns vary quite signi¯cantly across industries, with computer programming services exhibiting
one of the highest returns and motion picture / videotape production the lowest. The dispersion in
book-to-market ratios across industries is equally striking, with book printing and motion picture
/ videotape production exhibiting the highest and lowest book-to-market ratios, respectively.
Our primary empirical results are presented in Table 3 (¯rm and industry subscripts have been
dropped). Coe±cients in the ¯rst column of this table come from baseline estimates in which
copyright measures are omitted from the speci¯cation. In general, our ¯nancial variables predict
excess returns in a manner which is consistent with prior ¯ndings: the book-to-market and return on
equity variables are associated with excess returns in a positive and statistically signi¯cant manner
19The SIC major group codes for those ¯rms which we had an a priori reason for including in our sample are: 27
(Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries), 73 (Business Services) and 78 (Motion Pictures).
20The exact procedure used for identifying the variables above in the raw data and eliminating missing values is
outlined in Vuolteenaho (2002) p. 238.
21Earlier and later time periods were characterized by relatively large gaps in the relevant ¯nancial variables and
a rapid decline in the number of ¯rms in our sample. We present results from a larger cross-section below.
14with the coe±cient on the latter variable exhibiting higher precision. The statistical signi¯cance of
the coe±cients on the ¯rst two lags of r provides evidence of persistence in equity returns, moreover,
the roots of the autoregressive process are consistent with stability in equity returns over time (net
of trend).
The results reported in the second column of Table 3 are obtained when the statutory and case
law copyright variables are included as explanatory variables. Measures of legal innovations improve
the ¯t of the fundamental ¯nancial model in a statistically signi¯cant manner (a likelihood ratio
test establishes the joint signi¯cance of the four coe±cients on statutory and case law innovations
at a 99% con¯dence level). All coe±cients take on a theoretically plausible sign suggesting that a
broadening of copyright law is associated with an increase in equity returns. However, the statutory
coe±cients are not individually signi¯cant at conventional levels. The inability of statutes to
meaningfully predict outcomes in copyright industries is not a unique ¯nding. In marked contrast,
the coe±cient on the second lag of the case law variable obtains a 1% level of signi¯cance while the
¯rst lag of the case law variable is marginally signi¯cant (p-value of .13). These coe±cients imply
that excess returns for a ¯rm in our sample increase by a total of 23 basis points two quarters
after federal case law broadens copyright. The remaining columns in Table 3 provide a more
detailed picture of the relationship between copyright law and the equity value of ¯rms. In the
third column, we include a contemporaneous measure of the net cases broadening copyright. The
coe±cient estimate on this variable could be unreliable if there is any reason to believe that high
excess returns simultaneously increase the likelihood that case law would broaden copyright, so
these results should be interpreted with caution. With the inclusion of this variable, the coe±cient
on the ¯rst lag of copyright becomes signi¯cant at the 10% level and our results imply a 32 basis
point impact of case broadening.
One might be concerned that these results could be spurious. For example, it could be that
15regularity in the timing of court decisions is arbitrarily synchronized with increases in excess returns.
If this were the case, a broadening decision and a narrowing decision should exhibit a similar
relationship to excess returns. In order to investigate this possibility, counts of the number of cases
broadening and the number of cases narrowing copyright are entered separately as explanatory
variables. We employ two lags of each of these variables. We obtain positive coe±cients on the
number of cases broadening copyright, these results are signi¯cant at the 10% level. According to
these estimates, one case broadening copyright is associated with a 34 basis point increase in equity
returns. In contrast, the coe±cients on the case narrowing variables are negative with the second lag
exhibiting a 10% level of signi¯cance. These results suggest that our case count variable does seem
to represent a factor which drives equity valuation in a theoretically plausible and statistically
signi¯cant manner. In the last column of Table 3, we di®erentiate between the origin of court
decisions. The number of net cases broadening copyright decided by the Supreme Court (°sup) and
the Circuit Court of Appeals (°circ) are employed as separate explanatory variables. In general, we
obtain more precise results with Supreme Court decisions indicating that broadening by the high
court is associated with a 110 basis point increase in excess returns. Our results suggest there is
an anomalous and small short run decrease in excess returns one quarter after a Supreme Court
decision but that equity values more than compensate for this drop one quarter later. As one might
expect, Circuit Court decisions have a relatively smaller, but signi¯cant, positive impact on equity
valuation.
In Table 4 we explore whether our results hold when we employ a more narrow set of cases
which ex-post legal scholarship have identi¯ed as in°uential.22 The results in the ¯rst column of
this table indicate that the coe±cients on these in°uential cases are larger in their point values
with the ¯rst lag exhibiting relatively greater precision. Both coe±cients are signi¯cant at conven-
22We have not presented all of the coe±cients from estimating in this table, these results are available upon request
from the authors.
16tional levels and suggest that excess returns by 38 basis points in response to case law broadening
copyright. The second column of results indicates that this result does not drastically change when
contemporaneous case law counts are included in estimation (the new coe±cient is associated with
a p-value of .19). The third column of results, in which broadening and narrowing case counts are
entered separately, yields the largest point estimate for the impact of broadening court decisions.
The coe±cients on °b are signi¯cant at a 5% level and imply that excess returns increase by 47
basis points two quarters after case law broadens copyright. The coe±cients on the narrowing case
count variables are not statistically signi¯cant at conventional levels.
In order to test the assumption implicit in our speci¯cation that a case directly pertaining
to one narrow group of parties spills over to the equity valuation of a broader range of related
¯rms we have matched each decision to those industries which are most directly associated with
the focus of each case (we create this variable using the broad group of cases employed in the
estimates from Table 3). The estimates from this exercise are presented in the fourth column
and are generally consistent with the previously described ¯ndings of a positive and statistically
signi¯cant relationship between equity valuation and copyright broadening case law. In the ¯fth
column, we attempt to test the relative strength of the channels by which case law exerts an impact
on excess returns, that is, whether the spill-over e®ect is stronger or weaker than the industry-level
e®ect. When we include the original copyright count variable alongside the industry-matched case
count variable, the relatively larger point value and statistical signi¯cance of the coe±cient on the
second lag of °, in light of the imprecision in the coe±cients on °ind, suggests that the spill-over
e®ect across ¯rms is relatively stronger. In general, the ¯ndings presented in Table 4 suggest that
our original results are robust to a re-de¯nition of our case count variable and may represent a
conservative estimate of the relationship between equity valuation and case law.
The relatively limited number of ¯rms in our sample may cause some concern over whether our
17results would continue to hold across the wider cross-section of ¯rms in copyright industries. In
order for a ¯rm to be included in our sample, we require that it has a continuous time series for each
of the ¯nancial variables over the years 1986 - 1998. In Table 5 we present summary statistics for
total sales in the years 1987, 92 and 97 for the 29 ¯rms which meet our sample selection criterion.
We are concerned that these ¯rms are drawn from the larger, more stable, portion of the copyright
industry population. In order to investigate this possibility, we divide our sample into three sub-
periods (1986-89, 90-94, and 95-98). A continuous time series for all variables could be obtained
for 30, 53, and 122 ¯rms, respectively in these sub-samples. Sales summary statistics presented in
Table 5 con¯rm that our narrow cross-section consisted of larger ¯rms, average sales are consistently
lower in the larger cross-sections. In 1997, average sales among the larger cross-section was less
than half of the average for the 29 ¯rm sample.
In Table 6 we attempt to investigate whether our baseline results obtain when smaller ¯rms are
included in our sample. The results reported in column (1) suggest that our fundamental reduced
form speci¯cation performs quite poorly in forecasting excess returns: book-to-market and return on
equity are not related to equity valuations in a statistically signi¯cant manner. Similarly, copyright
law is very imprecisely related to excess returns. Turning to the second column of results, we
¯nd that earnings are related to equity valuations in a positive and statistically signi¯cant manner
among the 53 ¯rms in the 1990-94 period. In addition, the second lag of the copyright case law
variable is positive and statistically signi¯cant at the 10% level. In the ¯nal sample of 122 ¯rms,
we obtain coe±cients on both lags of the copyright variable which are positive and statistically
signi¯cant at the 1% level.23 Despite overall poor performance of our model in the ¯rst sub-period,
the qualitative implications of our results are generally robust to the inclusion of smaller ¯rms in
our cross-section.
23The statutory variables are dropped from estimation in this sub-period since no major statutory innovations
occurred.
18There is one important quali¯cation to this ¯nding. The coe±cient estimates reported in the
¯rst three columns of Table 6 deviate from prior estimates due to two considerations: the broader
cross-section of ¯rms and any possible instability over time in our model's parameters. In order to
eliminate the latter in°uence, we split the 122 ¯rm cross-section from the 1995-98 sub-period into
three size categories (small, medium, and large) according to the size of total sales (small ¯rms are
those with sales below percentile 25 in 1997, medium - sales between percentile 25 and 75, large -
sales above percentile 75). The results of this sample split are reported in the last three columns
of Table 6. The coe±cients on ° are positive among the smallest ¯rms, but are not statistically
signi¯cant. We also ¯nd that a broader copyright case law is related to excess returns in a positive
and statistically signi¯cant manner among the 75% of ¯rms in the medium and large ranges. In
general, these results suggest that copyright is an important determinant of equity valuation across
much of the size distribution of ¯rms.
4 Conclusion
Existing research has provided limited empirical evidence that the state of copyright law is a signif-
icant determinant of the °ow of copyrighted works or the return to copyright activity. The lack of
such quantitative information hampers an understanding of whether current law has appropriately
balanced incentives for creation with the distortions caused by an author's grant of excludeability.
In this paper, we have presented measures of copyright law derived from both statute and case
law. We ¯nd that, within a standard model of ¯rm-level equity valuation, excess returns to equity
in copyright industries are driven, in part, by the breadth of copyright as determined by courts.
Our results are robust across the size distribution of ¯rms and suggest that the state of case law is
potentially one of the non-tangible assets e®ecting the value of equity (for more on this topic, see
Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (1999)).
19While these ¯ndings are one of the few signs that law does have an important role in determin-
ing outcomes in copyright industries, a number of open questions remain. The response of equity
value to case law may be driven by a host of possible considerations. When copyright case law is
broadened, equity market participants may anticipate a larger °ow of new and pro¯table copyright
works due to the additional incentives provided authors and re-price equity accordingly. Alterna-
tively, an equity market may incorporate into prices the additional \monopoly" returns which ¯rms
might derive from the existing body of copyrighted works. This paper has not determined which
of these considerations underly the results. However, pursuing this topic is clearly important for
future research.
The ¯ndings of such research may have been anticipated by an amicus curiae brief ¯led by
seventeen prominent economists (29% of whom were Nobel laureates) as part of a Supreme Court
case determining the constitutionality of the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.24
The authors of this brief conclude that lengthening the term of copyright by statute provides
minimal additional incentive for the creation of new works, due to the length of time over which
authors must discount the additional returns from excludeability. In contrast, such extensions
signi¯cantly increase the return to existing works and represent a toll for \standing on the shoulders
of giants" in the sense that the cost of creating derivative works rises in the length of copyright
term.25 This analysis suggests that the incentive e®ects of copyright case law may be less relevant
in determining the response of equity valuation to copyright case law.
24The economists are George A. Akerlof, Kenneth J. Arrow, Timothy F. Bresnahan, James M. Buchanan, Ronald H.
Coase, Linda R. Cohen, Milton Friedman, Jerry R. Green, Robert W. Hahn, Thomas W. Hazlett, C. Scott Hemphill,
Robert E. Litan, Roger G. Noll, Richard Schmalensee, Steven Shavell, Hal R. Varian, and Richard J. Zeckhauser.
The brief is Akerlof et. al. as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioners at 12, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618.
25See Liebowitz and Margolis (2003) for a retort to this argument.
20Table 1
Summary Statistics - Case Law
SIC Code
Court Branch 27 73 78
All Broadening 278 79 61 27
Narrowing 264 91 44 29
Total 542 170 105 56
Supreme Broadening 6 2 1 2
Narrowing 7 1 0 0
Total 13 3 1 2
Circuit Broadening 272 77 60 25
Narrowing 257 90 44 29








































Copyright Case Law Over Time
21Table 2
Summary Statistics, 1986:Q1 -1998:Q4
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
r 0.016 0.106 -0.489 2.483 1508
e 0.015 0.07 -0.714 0.961 1508
µ 0.505 1.534 -2.785 6.057 1508
° 0.154 3.411 -8 7 1508
Newspapers (2711)
r 0.011 0.049 -0.136 0.328 468
e 0.035 0.048 -0.714 0.259 468
µ -0.324 0.705 -2.132 1.64 468
Periodicals (2721)
r 0.014 0.079 -0.217 0.351 156
e 0.006 0.122 -0.682 0.961 156
µ 0.02 0.934 -1.723 1.48 156
Books (2731)
r 0.015 0.071 -0.196 0.328 156
e 0.028 0.038 -0.203 0.146 156
µ 2.536 1.403 -0.267 5.628 156
Book Printing (2732)
r 0.008 0.065 -0.153 0.173 52
e 0.014 0.029 -0.111 0.065 52
µ 3.639 0.652 2.4 5.478 52
Computer Programming Services (7371)
r 0.028 0.099 -0.214 0.353 156
e 0.014 0.049 -0.19 0.082 156
µ 0.868 1.965 -2.397 6.057 156
Prepackaged Software (7372)
r 0.019 0.158 -0.489 2.483 468
e -0.002 0.074 -0.634 0.488 468
µ 0.426 1.206 -2.785 4.633 468
Motion Picture / Videotape Production (7812)
r 0.001 0.107 -0.258 0.367 52
e -0.007 0.098 -0.383 0.093 52
µ -0.197 0.481 -0.876 0.834 52
Notes:
1. Variable de¯nitions: r - log excess stock return, e - log return on equity, µ - log book to market ratio, °
- number of court decisions broadening copyright net of decisions narrowing copyright.
2. The newspapers, periodicals and books industry groups (2711, 2721, 2732) include ¯rms which publish
as well as ¯rms which print and publish.
3. Each ¯rm has observations over 52 quarters; there are a total of 29 ¯rms across all industries.
22Table 3
Dependent Variable - Log of Excess Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
µt¡1 .001 .0004 .0003 .0005 .0007
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
µt¡2 .007 .008 .008 .008 .007
(.004)¤ (.004)¤ (.004)¤ (.004)¤ (.004)¤
et¡1 .148 .158 .157 .158 .16
(.026)¤¤¤ (.027)¤¤¤ (.027)¤¤¤ (.027)¤¤¤ (.026)¤¤¤
et¡2 -.005 -.003 -.004 -.002 -.001
(.026) (.027) (.027) (.027) (.026)
¾t¡1 . .003 .004 .004 .003
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
¾t¡2 . .007 .005 .004 .012
(.006) (.007) (.007) (.006)¤
°t . . .0007 . .
(.0005)
°t¡1 . .0007 .0009 . .
(.0005) (.0005)¤
°t¡2 . .002 .002 . .
(.0005)¤¤¤ (.0005)¤¤¤
°b
t¡1 . . . .002 .
(.0008)¤
°b
t¡2 . . . .002 .
(.0008)¤¤
°n
t¡1 . . . -.000 .
(.0007)
°n








t¡2 . . . . .016
(.004)¤¤¤
°circ
t¡1 . . . . .001
(.0005)¤¤
°circ
t¡2 . . . . .0008
(.0005)
23Table 3
Dependent Variable - Log of Excess Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
rt¡1 -.079 -.085 -.088 -.084 -.083
(.028)¤¤¤ (.028)¤¤¤ (.028)¤¤¤ (.028)¤¤¤ (.028)¤¤¤
rt¡2 -.123 -.129 -.13 -.131 -.129
(.027)¤¤¤ (.027)¤¤¤ (.027)¤¤¤ (.027)¤¤¤ (.027)¤¤¤
rt¡3 -.041 -.045 -.043 -.046 -.034
(.026) (.026)¤ (.026)¤ (.026)¤ (.026)
rt¡4 -.025 -.023 -.025 -.022 -.018
(.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026)
J 29 29 29 29 29
T 52 52 52 52 52
N 1508 1508 1508 1508 1508
L 1829.815 1837.253 1838.151 1838.105 1847.238
Â2 117:472¤¤¤ 132:575¤¤¤ 134:783¤¤¤ 134:124¤¤¤ 154:71¤¤¤
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses, ***, **, and * indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
2. Variable de¯nitions: r - log excess stock return, e - log return on equity, µ - log book to market ratio,
¾ - statutes broadening copyright, ° - number of court decisions broadening copyright net of decisions
narrowing copyright, °
b - number of decisions broadening copyright, °
n - number of decisions narrowing
copyright, °
sup - net broadening decisions from the supreme court, °
circ - net broadening decisions from
appellate circuit courts.
3. All estimates obtained using Feasible Generalized Least Squares which adjusts for ¯rm-level heteroscedas-
ticity. Sample: 1986:Q1-1998:Q4. All speci¯cations include a time trend as well as quarterly and industry
dummy variables. These results are not reported but are available upon request from authors. Time
trend, one quarterly dummy (Q3), and two industry dummies (for SIC 2731 and 2732) are signi¯cant in
all speci¯cations.
4. J - number of ¯rms, T - number of quarters, N - number of observations, L - value of log-likelihood
function, Â
2 - Wald test of joint signi¯cance of all coe±cients (with degrees of freedom 18, 22, 23, 24,
and 24 for each of the ¯ve speci¯cations).
24Table 4
Ex-Post In°uential Cases & Industry Speci¯c Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
°t . -.0008 . . .
(.0007)
°t¡1 .001 .001 . . .001
(.0007)¤ (.0007) (.0003)
°t¡2 .003 .003 . . .002
(.0007)¤¤¤ (.0007)¤¤¤ (.0007)¤¤¤
°b
t¡1 . . .002 . .
(.0008)¤¤
°b
t¡2 . . .003 . .
(.0008)¤¤¤
°n
t¡1 . . .0006 . .
(.001)
°n
t¡2 . . -.001 . .
(.001)
°ind
t¡1 . . . .002 .001
(.001) (.001)
°ind
t¡2 . . . .002 -.0003
(.001)¤ (.001)
J 29 29 29 29 29
T 52 52 52 52 52
N 1508 1508 1508 1508 1508
L 1839.9 1840.773 1841.256 1834.545 1837.161
Â2 137:639¤¤¤ 139:431¤¤¤ 139:47¤¤¤ 126:207¤¤¤ 132:332¤¤¤
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses, ***, **, and * indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
2. Variable de¯nitions: ° - number of court decisions broadening copyright net of decisions narrowing
copyright, °
b;°
n - number of decisions broadening and narrowing copyright, respectively. In columns
(1) through (3), these variables only capture those cases discussed by Brown and Denicola (2002), we
therefore view these cases as ex-post in°uential. °
ind - net broadening decisions matched to the relevant
industry by two-digit SIC code; this variable captures all cases.
3. All estimates obtained using Feasible Generalized Least Squares which adjusts for ¯rm-level heteroscedas-
ticity. Sample: 1986:Q1-1998:Q4. All speci¯cations include a time trend as well as quarterly and industry
dummy variables. These results are not reported but are available upon request from the authors.
4. J - number of ¯rms, T - number of quarters, N - number of observations, L - value of log-likelihood
function, Â
2 - Wald test of joint signi¯cance of all coe±cients (with degrees of freedom 22, 23, 24, 22,
and 24 for each of the ¯ve speci¯cations).
25Table 5
Summary Statistics - Total Sales (millions)
29 Firm Cross-Section Large Cross-Section
Average Min. Max Year Firms Average Min Max
140.25 .022 835.39 1987 30 135.90 .02 835.39
161.95 0 935.09 1992 53 112.86 0 935.09




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1986-89 1990-94 1995-98 Small Medium Large
µt¡1 -.001 .003 -.001 0 -.0006 -.004
(.007) (.009) (.003) (.016) (.004) (.004)
µt¡2 .006 .008 .01 .032 .007 .01
(.007) (.008) (.003)¤¤¤ (.016)¤¤ (.004) (.004)¤¤
et¡1 -.006 .092 .071 .071 .057 .088
(.032) (.03)¤¤¤ (.017)¤¤¤ (.036)¤¤ (.025)¤¤ (.032)¤¤¤
et¡2 -.006 -.021 .009 -.003 .019 -.013
(.031) (.034) (.018) (.034) (.028) (.031)
¾t¡1 .017 .002 . . . .
(.018) (.006)
¾t¡2 .023 -.001 . . . .
(.016) (.007)
°t¡1 .0005 0 .002 .002 .0003 .003
(.001) (.001) (.0005)¤¤¤ (.002) (.0008) (.0006)¤¤¤
°t¡2 .002 .001 .003 .001 .004 .004
(.002) (.0008)¤ (.0005)¤¤¤ (.002) (.0008)¤¤¤ (.0006)¤¤¤
rt¡1 -.129 -.13 -.148 -.215 -.117 -.167
(.051)¤¤ (.03)¤¤¤ (.027)¤¤¤ (.063)¤¤¤ (.037)¤¤¤ (.052)¤¤¤
rt¡2 -.172 -.07 -.046 -.111 -.014 -.053
(.046)¤¤¤ (.027)¤¤¤ (.027)¤ (.057)¤¤ (.037) (.053)
rt¡3 -.146 .05 .05 -.013 .08 .029
(.044)¤¤¤ (.027)¤ (.026)¤ (.056) (.036)¤¤ (.054)
rt¡4 .014 .02 -.04 -.036 -.07 .008
(.043) (.026) (.025) (.054) (.035)¤¤ (.052)
J 30 53 122 31 62 29
T 16 16 12 12 12 12
N 480 848 1464 372 744 348
L 586.563 1105.02 1392.979 203.046 701.071 513.422
Â2 59:924¤¤¤ 112:35¤¤¤ 179:131¤¤¤ 50:028¤¤¤ 67:391¤¤¤ 121:796¤¤¤
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses, ***, **, and * indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
2. Variable de¯nitions: r - log excess stock return, e - log return on equity, µ - log book to market ratio, ¾ - statutes
broadening copyright, ° - number of court decisions broadening copyright net of decisions narrowing copyright.
3. To categorize ¯rms by size, sales were averaged across the four quarters of 1997. Those ¯rms with sales below the
25th percentile of this value were categorized as small, those ¯rms with sales greater than or equal to the 25th
percentile and less than the 75th percentile were categorized as medium and those ¯rms with sales greater than
or equal to the 75th percentile were categorized as large.
4. All estimates obtained using Feasible Generalized Least Squares which adjusts for ¯rm-level heteroscedasticity.
All speci¯cations include a time trend as well as quarterly and industry dummy variables. These results are not
reported but are available upon request from authors.
5. J - number of ¯rms, T - number of quarters, N - number of observations, L - value of log-likelihood function, Â2
- Wald test of joint signi¯cance of all coe±cients (with degrees of freedom 22, 23, 21, 19, 21, and 19 for each of
the six speci¯cations).
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